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Administrative Law-Medical Opinion Held Not Substantial
Evidence to Sustain a Fraud Order-The Postmaster General issued
a fraud order against the petitioner for selling a drug advertised as valuable
for reducing.' The district court enjoined the local postmaster from car-
rying out the order.2 On appeal the injunction was affirmed (one judge
dissenting) on the ground that medical opinion based on general scien-
tific knowledge, rather than upon personal observation, was not substan-
tial evidence, when contested by contrary medical opinion, for a finding that
the drug was valueless. Pinkus v. Reilly, 170 F. 2d 786 (3d Cir. 1948).
Courts have fixed strict requirements for the evidence necessary to
sustain a fraud order. It was early held, in American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty,8 that the postmaster can not issue a fraud order
when a representation is honestly made about a subject where opinions
reasonably differ. In this situation, the court stated, the truth of the
representation was not capable of proof. This limitation appears to result
from a requirement that either willful falsity 4 or such recklessness as to
amount to bad faith be shown. 5 In the instant case, the McAnnulty case
is used by analogy to draw a distinction between expert opinion evi-
dence based on general medical knowledge and that based on personal ob-
servation. The court reasons that if there is conflicting medical opinion
in the record, then the postmaster general has no more authority to issue
a fraud order than he would if the representation were one not subject
to proof, as in the McAnnulty case.
When similar issues have been raised concerning the truthfulness of
patent medicine advertisements under the FTCA, there has been little
difficulty in upholding cease and desist orders on general medical testimony
alone.7 In such cases no distinction has been drawn between medical
opinion based upon personal observation and that resulting from general
medical knowledge.8 The difference between the result reached in the
principal case and that in FTC cases may perhaps be explained both by
the greater reluctance of courts to enforce fraud orders because of their
1. IEv. STAT. § 3929 (1875), as amended, 39 U. S. C. § 295 (1946) ; REv. STAT.
§4041 (1875), as amended, 39 U. S. C. § 732 (1946). Together these statutes pro-
vide in substance that the Postmaster General, on substantial evidence of fraud, may
order all letters addressed to a particular person returned to senders marked "fraud-
ulent" and may order local postmasters to refuse to pay money orders in which such
person is named as payee.
2. 71 F. Supp. 993 (D. N. J. 1947).
3. 187 U. S. 94 (1902).
4. Fields v. Hannegan, 162 F. 2d 17 (D. C. Cir. 1947) ; Rood v. Goodman, 83 F. 2d
28 (5th Cir. 1936).
5. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138 (1922); Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129
Fed. 623 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1904).
6. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §45 (1946).
7. Neff v. FTC, 117 F. 2d 495 (4th Cir. 1941); Dr. Caldwell, Inc. v. FTC, 111
F. 2d 889 (7th Cir. 1940).
8. -See Haynes & Co. v. FTC, 105 F. 2d 988, 989 (2d Cir. 1939).
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harsh consequences to the individual 9 and, possibly by difference in statu-
tory language.' 0
The result reached by the instant case might find support in authority
if further factual evidence were easily obtainable. 1 However, the court
rests its decision on the premise that if evidence is conflicting, there is
then an honest difference of opinion. This reasoning disregards the fact
that, as a practical matter, the opinion of experts can be obtained to sup-
port almost any proposition.12 Further, the holding that more probative
effect should be given to medical opinion based upon personal experience
than to that based upon general scientific knowledge involves the danger
of imposing impractical limitations on fact finders; for there are many
areas in which conclusions can be reached only by basing them on scien-
tific knowledge. In our present world of specialization, such knowledge
is seldom the result of the personal observations or tests of a single indi-
vidual.13
Bills and Notes-Drawing a Check Against Uncollected Funds
Held Not a Violation of Bad Check Law-Appellant was indicted for
swindling under the Texas bad check law.' He had made a deposit of a
check drawn on an out-of-city bank for which he received a deposit slip.
The bank had not notified him that checks against the item would not be
honored. The accused drew a check on these uncollected funds which
was, because of this fact, dishonored on presentment. Although he was
found guilty by the jury, the court affirmed a reversal of the conviction.
Moody v. State, 213 S. W. 2d 539 (Tex. App. 1948).
A criminal prosecution for drawing against a deposit of a valid but
as yet uncollected check presents a novel case.2  Since nearly every bad
check law requires an intent to defraud,3 the reversal of the conviction
is not surprising. Although the Texas statute typically provides that
non-payment shall be prima facie evidence of such intent, the court has
required, to justify a conviction, proof of facts establishing an intent to
defraud beyond reasonable doubt.4 Even cases admitting the presumption
9. See note 1 supra.
10. Compare REv. STAT. § 3929 (1875), as amended, 39 U. S. C. § 295 (1946)
.. . any person . . . is conducting any . . . scheme or device for obtaining
money . . . through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretences .
with 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1946) providing: "any such
person . has been or is using any unfair method of competition in com-
merce ... " See also Note, Superstition and the Mails, 35 LAw NOTEs 130 (1931),
for a descussion of the interpretation given the fraud order statute.
11. E. g., Jarvis v. Shackelton Inhaler Co., 136 F. 2d 116 (6th Cir. 1943).
12. See Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1138, 1169 (1933) for the position that indiscrim-
inate use of expert opinion evidence leads to a situation closely analogous to wager of
law.
13. See 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 687 (3d ed. 1940) for reasoning denying any dis-
tinction between evidence based on observation and general knowledge in relation to
the somewhat analogous problem of admissibility of evidence.
1. TEX. PENAL CODE, tit. 11, Art. 567b (Vernon, Supp. 1947).
2. Cf. People v. Routh, 182 Cal. 561, 189 Pac. 436 (1920).
3. Although every state has one or more worthless check laws, only Kansas has
held that an intent to defraud is not a necessary element of the crime. State v.
Bechtelheimer, 151 Kan. 582, 100 P. 2d 657 (1940) ; State v. Gillen, 151 Kan. 359, 99
P. 2d 832 (1940).
4. Kuykendall v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 607, 160 S. W. 2d 525 (1942).
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allow its easy rebuttal 5 by evidence introduced by the accused or by the
state.
0
Although apparently unnecessary to sustain its reversal, the court
stated its holding as follows: ". . . the check was dishonored because of
the acts of the bank rather than those of the appellant. If the bank was
not going to honor checks against the deposit, it should have in some way
so advised appellant." 7 Taken literally, this holds the bank at fault for
non-payment of a check drawn on uncollected funds, and impliedly gives
appellant an action for credit damage. Such a result would be contrary
to the cases 8 and to existing bank practice. It abrogates the rule of the
courts, 9 the standard depositor's agreement,' 0 and the statutes 11 that a
bank is merely an agent for collection and not a purchaser of deposited
checks. Carried to its extreme this interpretation may be said to condone
check-kiting,12 or at least put the burden of stopping such practices on
the bank. The language can be narrowed merely to mean that if the
practice has existed for a depositor to draw on uncollected funds the
bank must take affirmative action if they intend to discontinue such prac-
tice.'3 Furthermore, since it is apparent that banks can watch only a few
per cent of their accounts for checks drawn on uncollected funds, a de-
positor may draw on such funds unnoticed and uncontested for some time.
Even if appellant was put on notice of the agency relationship by statute
or by his depositor's agreement, such knowledge alone does not preclude
permission to draw on uncollected funds. 14 Therefore, the accused had
reasonable grounds to believe his check would be paid. Since the Texas
court has squarely held that evidence of such a belief will rebut the pre-
sumption,15 it seems logical to interpret the words of this criminal court "I
as merely a finding that the intent necessary for conviction under the
statute was absent. For the reasons indicated, it seems important so to
restrict the decision.
5. Coffee v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. R. 71, 184 S. W. 2d 278 (1945) ; Lloyd v. State,
98 Tex. Cr. R. 504, 266 S. W. 785 (1924) ; accord, People v. Becker, 137 Cal. App.
349, 30 P. 2d 562 (2d Dist. 1934) ; State v. Vandenburg, 9 Harr. 320, 198 Atl. 701 (Del.
Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938) ; Wolfe v. State, 76 Fla. 168, 79 So. 449 (1918).
6. State v. Thompson, 37 N. M. 229, 20 P. 2d 1030 (1933).
7. Instant case at 540.
8. E. g., Cunningham v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 4 F. 2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925), cert.
denied, 268 U. S. 691 (1925).
9. E. .q., Keyes v. Paducah & I. R. R., 61 F. 2d 611 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Central
Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis, 149 S. W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
10. Many banks, including that of the accused, stipulate in their passbook, deposi-
tor's agreement, or deposit slip the standard collection agreement as recommended
by the American Bankers Association which specifies that the bank is acting solely
as a collecting agent.
11. TEX. STAT., § 342-702 (Vernon, 1947).
12. An offense committed where there is a deliberate deposit of a worthless check
in a bank for the purpose of creating a fictional credit against which further checks
are drawn.
13. The Texas banking statute deems drafts on funds in the process of collection
as extensions of credit by the bank to the drawer. However, the language appears to
only allow such practice with the consent of the bank. See note 11 supra.
14. In re Jarmulowsky, 243 Fed. 632 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), aff'd, 249 Fed. 319 (2d
Cir. 1918) ; see note 11 supra.
15. Coffee v. State, supra.
16. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviews only criminal cases and is com-
posed of different judges from those who review civil cases.
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Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Revenue Law of a Foreign
State Refused-The City of Detroit, Michigan, and the Treasurer of
the city, brought suit against the defendant in Delaware for the amount
of a tax levied on defendant's personal property by plaintiff city. A de-
murrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that one state will
not enforce the revenue law of another state or political subdivision therof.
City of Detroit v. Proctor, 61 A. 2d 412 (Del. Super. 1948).
The refusal of the Delaware court to entertain an original suit for
enforcement of a sister state's revenue laws is in accord with all but
a handful of decisions on the question.' The rule had its roots in an
English desire to promote commerce beneficial to that country,2 and arose
in suits between private parties involving contracts invalid under foreign
revenue laws.3 The doctrine was early applied in this country under the
same circumstances, 4 and was later extended to suits between states and
delinquent taxpayers, 5 at first without enunciation of any reasons for the
rule. When the doctrine was at last examined, it was said that the same
policy which prevented states from enforcing each other's penal laws pre-
vented enforcement of their revenue laws.6 However, the analogy be-
tween penal laws and revenue laws was in turn subjected to criticism,7
and when the situation again arose in this country, a Missouri court held
that it would enforce the revenue laws of its sister state.8
Although a state is requited to accord full faith and credit to foreign
judgments obtained on tax liabilities,9 whether it must similarly regard the
obligation of foreign tax statutes, is still an open question. 10 But it is
clear that one state may, if it wishes, enforce such revenue laws, on prin-
ciples of comity." The original reasons for refusal to entertain such
suits are not convincing when viewed in the light of our federal system
and under modem conditions of mobility. The interest of the states as a
whole, or of any particular state, in preventing a delinquent taxpayer from
1. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S. W. 2d 919 (St. Louis C. A. 1946) ; Standard Embossing Co. v. American Salpa
Corp., 113 N. J. Eq. 468, 167 Atl. 755 (Ch. 1933) ; Holshouser v. Gold Hill Copper
Co., 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650 (1905). The latter two cases, although not discussing
the precise point here presented, allowed claims of foreign states for franchise taxes
due from corporations in receivership.
2. See, e. g., Lord Hardwicke, in Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. t. H. 85, 89, 95 Eng.
Rep. 53, 55, 56 (1734).
3. E. g., James v. Catherwood, 3 Dow. & Ry. 190 (1823) ; see Holman v. John-
son, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (1775) ; Boucher v. Lawson, supra.
Contra: Alves v. Hodgson, 7 T. R. 241, 101 Eng. Rep. 953 (1797).
4. Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 94 (N. Y. 1806).
5. E. g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. 2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929) (alternative holding),
aff'd. oft aiwther ground, 281 U. S. 18 (1930) ; Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133
N. E. 357 (1921) (alternative holding) ; see Henry v. Sargeant, 3 N. H. 321, 332
(1843) ; for a parallel English case, see Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bull, [1909]
1 K. B. 7.
6. See concurring opinion of L. Hand, J., in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. 2d 600, 603,
604 (2d Cir. 1929).
7. See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 271 (1935):
('199."the obligation to pay taxes is not penal."; Note, 29 CoL. L. Rxv. 782, 786
8. Oklahoma v. Rodgers, supra.
9. Milwaukee County v. White Co., supra.
10. Id. at 275.
11. Oklahoma v. Rodgers, supra. It is to be noted that Oklahoma had passed a
"reciprocity statute": "The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce liability
for taxes lawfully imposed by other States which extend a like comity to this State."
OYLA. STAT. ANN. § 1483, tit. 68 (1941).
1949]
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evading his obligation by absconding to another state with his assets seems
greatly to outweigh any objection the forum may have to adding another
case to its already crowded docket,12 construing a foreign tax statute, de-
termining whether its tax policy conflicts with that of the foreign state, 13
or meddling with the relations of a sister state and its citizens; 14 and
far from giving rise to interstate complications, such a practice of re-
ciprocal aid would seem to promote interstate understanding.' 5 The Dela-
ware court, in refusing to take the position pioneered by the Missouri court,
seems to have lost an opportunity to help properly resolve this dilemma
of interstate relations.
Constitutional Law-Advisory Opinion Upholding Legality of
Administering Electric Shock Treatments to Patients of State Mental
Hospitals Without Consent-In an opinion requested by the Secre-
tary of Welfare, the Department of Justice of Pennsylvania expressed the
conclusion that electroshock treatments might legally be administered to
mental patients of state hospitals, in the sound discretion of the superin-
tendents thereof, without first obtaining the written permission of the pa-
tients, their relatives, guardians, or other persons empowered to give con-
sent for such patients.-Shock Therapy in State Hospitals, 64 Pa. D. & C.
14 (1948).
The provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Act of 19231
which provide for involuntary confinement of the mentally ill in state
hospitals 2 have been declared constitutional.3 This statute empowers the
superintendent of any hospital for the treatment of mental diseases to
receive and detain any person who is mentally ill or who may need or
benefit by the treatment given persons who are mentally ill.4 Thus, it is
indicated that a fundamental reason for commitment is the care which is
to be given. Since there is no consent necessary to the authorized re-
straint, it would seem that none should be required before this care might
be legally undertaken. Such care has been stated to extend "so far as
to include every provision known to medical skill and science for the
12. The problem of overburdened dockets is a real one in states such as New
York, where there is a large amount of property owned by non-residents. Even so,
New York has adopted a reciprocal death tax statute, which may indicate a change
in policy as to enforcing foreign tax laws. N. Y. TAx LAW, § 249-t (2) (McKinney,
1943).
13. However, the problems of statutory construction and conflicting policy are not
considered insuperable in other fields of Conflict of Laws.
14. The objection seems especially weak here, since it is the foreign state itself
which is trying to enlist the aid of the forum.
15. For general problems concerning extra-territorial enforcement of revenue
laws, see Leflar, Extra-state Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Clahns, 46 HARV.
L. REv. 193, 218 et seq. (1932).
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, §§ 1-213 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
2. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, §§ 42, 43 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
3. See In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 10, 12 (E. D. Pa. 1942). In Hammon v. Hill, 228
Fed. 999, 1001 (W. D. Pa. 1915) the court said that it is the duty of the state to re-
strain and confine the insane.
4. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, §§ 41-58 (Purdon, Supp. 1947), the sections of the
Act dealing with commitment, contain words granting such authority. These sections
reflect the emphasis which the statute places upon the care which is to be given per-
sons committed.
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treatment of the diseased mind." 5 It seems clear that this language does
not justify subjection of patients in public mental hospitals to new or ex-
perimental techniques, but requires that reasonable standard treatments be
given these patients. Narcotics, insulin, and hydrotherapy have long been
recognized as such, and have been administered without prior consent.6
Since electric shock therapy is of very recent origin 7 and entails some
risk of harm,8 there may appear to be reason for requiring consent as a
condition precedent to its use. However, the exceptionally high rate of
cures resulting from electrically induced convulsions 9 seems conclusive of
its therapeutic merit. As a result, it is widely uesd today 10 and has
gained acceptance as the standard treatment for certain psychotic con-
ditions." Since the ill effects which might result are negligible either
in frequency or character,12 it is not such violent treatment as would
amount to an unreasonable invasion of bodily integrity. Thus, it seems
that electroshock may be considered as within the category of therapuetic
measures which constitute an essential part of commitment. The over-
population of public mental hospitals today is the basis of the state's in-
ability to cope more adequately with the problem presented by the ever-
increasing number of persons needing psychiatric attention.13  There is
strong evidence that general use of shock therapy in these hospitals will
permit broader and more effective utilization of the facilities available.' 4
In many cases, the patient might ordinarily remain in an institution for
months or years, at public expense, where immediate progress could be
made were electroshock treatments employed.' 5 In view of the benefit to
the public welfare that will accrue from unhindered use of shock therapy
in public hospitals, there appears even stronger reason to permit admin-
istration of such treatment unhampered by a requirement of prior con-
sent of a layman who may well be ignorant of its true nature. The public
welfare has been held to justify the imposition upon mental defectives of
such extreme measures as sexual sterilization. 16 The same considerations
5. See Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999, 1001 (W. D. Pa. 1915).
6. Instant opinion at page 18.
7. It was first developed in Italy in 1938. Shryock, Shock Therapy Saves Minds,
25 HYGEIA, THE HEALTH MAGAZINE 517 (1947).
8. A few deaths have been recorded and occasionally, fractures of the extremities
occur because of the violence of the convulsion.
9. See Shryock, op. cit. supra note 7, at 552; Batt, 100 Depressive Psychoses
Treated with Electrically Induced Convulsions, 89 JOUR. MENT. Sc. 289 (1943).
10. See KI-AINEs, THE THERAPY OF THE NEuRoSES AND PSYCHosEs 452459
(1943).
11. See KALINOWSKY AND HocH, SHOCK TREATMENTS AND OTHER SOMATIC
PROCEDURES IN PSYCHIATRY iX (1946) ; Gralnick, A Three-Year Survey of Electro-
shock Therapy, 102 Am. Joun. PSYCHIAT. 583 (1946).
12. Shock treatments have been used in Pennsylvania state hospitals since 1939.
There have been no deaths caused by these treatments. The fractures that occur
from time to time can be avoided with careful and improved techniques. There ap-
pears to be no impairment of the memory resulting from electroshock. Sherman, The
Effect of Convudsive Treatment on the Memory, 98 Am. JouE. PSYCHIAT. 401 (1942).
And since the patient loses consciousness immediately upon the passage of the current
through the brain, there is no unpleasant experience.
13. See The Situation in Pennsylvania Institutions for the Mentally Ill, Feeble-
Minded, and Epileptic, 49 PA. MED. JouR. 764 (1946).
14. See Penrose, Results of Shock Therapy Evaluated by Estimating Chances of
Patients Remaining in Hospital, 89 JoUR. MENT. Sc. 374 (1947).
15. Instant opinion at 16.
16. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1926).
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would appear to warrant the use of an effective treatment even though it
entails possible injury, particularly since such treatment, in most cases, is
beneficial to the subject.
The instant opinion is the first authoritative legal pronouncement
on the question here involved. The reasoning seems to represent a sound
recognition of medical progress, and the conclusion, to evaluate properly
the conflicting interests of society and of the individual.
Constitutional Law-Miscegenation Statute Violates Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of United States Constitution-A
county clerk, in compliance with a miscegenation statute,' refused to grant
a marriage license to a Negro man and white woman, whereupon the
couple proceeded in mandamus to compel the clerk to issue the license.
The California Supreme Court (three judges dissenting), in granting the
writ, held the statute an unreasonable and arbitrary regulation of the fun-
damental right to marry-a violation of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the United States Constitution.2  Perez v. Lippold, 198
P. 2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
Laws prohibiting miscegenetic marriages can be traced to Colonial
times." California's dates from its first legislative session.4  Twenty-nine
other jurisdictions still have such statutes. 5 Though frequently attacked
on constitutional grounds, they have always been upheld as a valid state
regulation. 6 It is established law that marriage a s affecting the morals
and general welfare is subject to state regulation.7 However, the right to
marry is guaranteed to the individual through the concept of "liberty"
in the Fourteenth Amendment.8  Just how far the state may go in re-
stricting this right without violating due process is uncertain.9 The early
courts in upholding miscegenation statutes based their decisions on sup-
posedly scientific facts which if true would justify this limitation.10 Later
courts merely follow precedent. They talk in general terms, declaring that
it is "well established law" that such statutes are a proper exercise of the
state's police power, often substantiating this by analogy to statutes pro-
1. CAL. Crv. CODE § 69 (Deering, 1941).
2. The court also held that the statute denied freedom of religion, and was too
vague and uncertain to be an enforceable restriction of a fundamental right, since it
did not define "mulatto."
3. Instant case at 38.
4. CAL. STAT., c. 140, § 3 (1850).
5. 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §44 (1931); Comment, Intermarriage
with Negroes-A Survey of State Statutes, 36 YALE L. J. 858 (1927).
6. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) ; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871) ; Lonas
v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871).
7. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 205 (1888) ; Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U. S. 14, 30 (1903).
8. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U. S. 390, 399 (1923).
9. MATHEws, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 410 (1932).
10. See Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869) (intermarriage produces weak
progeny) ; State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) (mixed unions incapable of repro-
duction).
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hibiting incestuous marriages, polygamy, and restrictions based on age. 1
It may well be that the courts fear to limit the legislative sphere on such
an emotional issue. The instant case takes a fresh approach in re-examin-
ing the factual basis allegedly supporting the statute's validity. It refutes
the time honored arguments that crossing of the races is biologically un-
sound,12 such marriages cause race tension, 13 and the progeny is a burden
on society.14  Finding no valid reason to support the statute, the court
holds it discriminatory, arbitrary, and unreasonable-a deprivation of the
right to marry the person of one's choice merely because of a difference in
race.'1
In view of the fact that the real basis for these statutes seems race
prejudice and false notions concerning color superiority,16 the court
properly concluded that due process had been violated. In so holding,
the court has removed the legal indorsement of race prejudice. The legal
consequences will be to legitimize the progeny, permit inheritance,' 7 and
reduce prosecution for illicit relations. It is doubtful whether there will
be corresponding social changes. More broadly, this decision might well
be used as a basis for analyzing other customary restrictions on the right
to marry where such prohibition might not be reasonable, e. g., marriages
prohibited on account of affinity.' 8 Undoubtedly this decision will stimu-
late the bringing of similar suits in other jurisdictions, the issue eventually
to be settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. The trend of
this Court's decisions lends support to a conclusion that the holding in the
instant case will be sustained.19
Criminal Procedure-State Statute Authorizing Extradition of
Non-fugitives Held Constitutional-In an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, the petitioner contended that he was not subject to in-
terstate rendition, having been absent from the demanding state at the
11. See Arizona v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 20, 121 P. 2d 882, 884 (1942); Kirby v.
Kirby, 24 Ariz. 9, 11, 206 Pac. 405, 406 (1922) ; In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont.
490, 496, 129 P. 2d 217, 220 (1942) ; Jackson v. Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 199, 124 P. 2d
240, 241 (1942).
12. Instant case at 22.
13. Id. at 25.
14. Id. at 27.
15. The court neatly distinguishes the miscegenation restriction from race segrega-
tion declaring the former a discriminatory deprivation of a right, the latter no sub-
stantial deprivation, since equal facilities must be provided.
16. 1 VERIER, AImv-izcAx FAmiLY LA s § 44 (1931) : "The peculiarly geographic
distribution of statutes prohibiting racial intermarriage forces one to conclude . . .
that such legislation is not based primarily upon physiological, psychological, or other
scientific bases, but is for the most part the product of local prejudice and of local
effort to protect the social and economic standards of the white race."
17. E. g., In re Estate of Fred Paquet, 101 Ore. 393, 200 Pac. 911 (1921) ; In re
Takahashi's Estate, supra.
18. Twenty-four states have express statutes which prohibit individuals from mar-
rying certain persons related by marriage. "It is difficult to construct any very logical
case for prohibition of marriage on grounds of affinity ... " 1 VERNmp, AmEmcAN
FAmY LAWS § 39 (1931).
19. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943) ; Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93 (1945) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214,
216 (1944) ; Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 646 (1948) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U. S. 1, 22 (1948).
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time of the alleged offense, and that a state statute I authorizing extra-
dition in such cases was unconstitutional. Discharging the writ, the Court
held that the statutory provision did not violate the Constitution. Ex
parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S. D. Cal. 1948).
The Constitution and implementing federal legislation 2 have been
construed to prohibit extradition under such authority unless the person
sought had fled the demanding state; 3 hence, where relator could es-
tablish absence therefrom at the time of the crime, he was entitled to
be released.4  Since numerous crimes do not require physical presence
within the state of jurisdiction, wrongdoers have frequently gone un-
punished.5 In an attempt to remedy this situation, the courts have given
a liberal interpretation to the federal statute, and to interstate rendition
in general. The Supreme Court has decided that interstate rendition is
not governed by the strict requirements of international law.6 It has
countenanced instances where the relator was unlawfully seized by officers
of the demanding state in the asylum state. 7 Arrest of the alleged fugi-
tive by officers of the asylum state prior to receipt of the requisition is not
authorized by the federal statute, yet such action has been upheld.8 In
some instances, however, even a liberal interpretation could not justify in-
terstate rendition under federal authority, and certain courts suggested
that state action was necessary and proper.9 Accordingly, reciprocal state
compacts have been made under congressional authorization, and have
received judicial approval. 10 A lack of complete coverage and uniformity
brought about the formulation of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
which has found increasing favor with state legislatures." Section 6,
under which petitioner was extradited in the instant case, has been the
most frequently attacked provision of the Act, on the ground that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction over extradition upon the
Federal Government. Although this argument is supported by dicta in
some of the early cases,' 2 its validity is opposed by reason and the weight
of authority. An examination of pre-constitutional history reveals that
considerable acrimony was engendered among the states by a mutual
failure to render extradition as a matter of comity,' 3 and it has been con-
vincingly argued that the constitutional provision was intended to provide
an enforceable federal standard for interstate rendition, rather than to
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1549.1 (Deering, 1941).
2. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 2(2); REv. STAT. § 5278 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 662
(1946).
3. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, 421 (1933) ; Ex parte Reggel, 114
U. S. 642, 651 (1885).
4. Hyatt v. People ex rel. Cockran, 186 U. S. 691 (1903).
5. Wigchert v. Lockhart, 114 Colo. 485, 166 P. 2d 988 (1946) ; State v. Hall, 115
N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729 (1894).
6. Biddinger v. Comm'r, 245 U. S. 128, 132 (1917) ; see Lascelles v. Georgia, 148
U. S. 537, 542 (1893).
7. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906) ; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700
(1888).
8. Burton v. New York Centr. R. R., 245 U. S. 315 (1917).
9. See United States v. Flegenheimer, 14 F. Supp. 584, 585 (D. N. J. 1935).
10. See, e. g., COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 153, § 44 (Supp. 1947) ; 48 STAT. 909 (1934),
18 U. S. C. § 420 (1946) ; In re Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 128 P. 2d 338 (1942).
11. At the date of writing, 33 states have adopted the Act. 9 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 29 (Supp. 1947).
12. See Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 617 (U. S. 1842).
13. A. P. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 55 (1930).
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curtail the exercise of the privilege- by the states.14  Therefore, while a
state may not limit federal extradition, it should have the right to enact
legislation to cover those situations falling outside the federal scope. Since
federal jurisdiction is confined to instances where accused has fled the
demanding state, legislation dealing with non-fugitives appears a valid
exercise of the police power under the Tenth Amendment.15 Although
state courts have uniformly found § 6 constitutional, 6 the instant case
represents the initial federal construction. The growth of interstate
criminal activity 17 makes mandatory the complete coverage provided by
the Uniform Act. However, optimum results cannot be obtained until
enactment by all jurisdictions, and it is to be hoped that those states which
have not yet done so will be urged in that direction by the unqualified ap-
proval of a federal court.
Evidence-Requiring Accused to Repeat Certain Words for Iden-
tification of His Voice Held Violation of Privilege Against Compul-
sory Self-incrimination-Shortly after his arrest, and before trial,1
accused was compelled, along with several other suspects, to repeat certain
words which the prosecutrix had previously stated were used by the per-
son who raped her. Solely on this basis, prosecutrix picked defendant
as her attacker and testified to that fact upon trial. Upon appeal from a
conviction, the court held that this procedure had violated defendant's
right against self-incrimination. State v. Taylor, 49 S. E. 2d 289 (S.
Car. 1948).
The extent to which an accused, who has not testified in his own
behalf, may be compelled to perform some affirmative act to aid the State
in connecting him with the crime is the subject of considerable judicial
controversy. While the courts are agreed that the privilege extends only
to "testimonial utterances," they differ as to the connotation of that phrase.
A few courts take the position that it relates only to oral or written
testimonial utterances, others that it includes any affirmative acts, while
the majority do not go so far in either direction. 2 It has been held that
a defendant may not even be required to stand up in court to give the
jury or a witness a better look at him.3  Most courts permit an examin-
ation of accused's body for identifying marks such as tattoos and scars,
4
14. See Lascelles v. Georgia, supra at 542; Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va. 557, 563,
29 S. E. 2d 245, 248 (1944).
15. Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 348, 44 N. E. 2d 807, 809 (1942),
appeal dismissed for lack of debatable constitutional question, 140 Ohio St. 426, 45
N. E. 2d 118 (1942).
16. English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N. E. 2d 898 (1947) ; see In re
Campbell, 147 Neb. 820, 825, 25 N. W. 2d 419, 423 (1946) ; Cassis v. Fair, supra at
562, 29 S. E. 2d at 247.
17. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERA'S CONFErENCE ON Ca-iE 3 et seq.
(1934).
1. Although there is disagreement, most courts hold that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination extends to pre-trial investigations. 8 WiGMoRE, EVI-
DENCE § 2265 n. 2. Wigmore contends that it does not. 8 id. § 2266.
2. See Note, 171 A. L. R. 1144 (1947).
3. Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 So. 2d 546 (1946).
4. O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137 (1890) ; State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev.
194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926) ; State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85 (1874) ; see People v. Strauss,
174 Misc. 881, 882, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 155, 156 (King's County 1940).
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but virtually all courts refuse to compel accused to submit to a medical
examination for pregnancy 5 or venereal disease." Many courts hold that
the privilege does not protect defendant from being required to try on
wearing apparel known to belong to the guilty person, or from being
compelled to make a comparison of his foot with a footprint, s although
others refuse to permit either. Prior to the instant case the application
of the privilege to a defendant who had been compelled to repeat certain
words for identification of his voice had been discussed in only two cases.
In one, a Pennsylvania case, the court stated by way of dictum that this
did not violate the privilege,9 while in the other a Texas court squarely
held that it did.10
Although the historical details giving rise to the privilege are not
clear," it is generally accepted that its original purpose was to bring to
an end the practice of employing legal process to extract from a person
an admission of his guilt.'2 In view of this, "testimonial utterances" have
been defined as those which involve the defendant's knowledge of the
facts and the operations of his mind in expressing them.' s Consequently,
all legal writers on the subject contend that the privilege does not prevent
the prosecution from requiring an accused to do certain things to permit
others to identify him.' 4 It seems clear that requiring defendant to parrot
back certain words neither compels an admission of guilt nor engenders
any of the dangers that the safeguard was intended to prevent. Acceptance
by the courts of this line of reasoning will do much to enable application
of the privilege to preserve the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial
without making it a barrier to the investigation and punishment of crime.
Income Taxation-Corporation Held Taxable for Collections by
Stockholders on Charged-Off Notes Made Subject to Dividend in Kind
-A bank charged off certain notes as bad debts and deducted them from
its taxable income. Shortly after it had begun to receive collections on
these notes, it declared a dividend in kind of those outstanding and con-
sidered collectible, indorsing them to an employee as trustee for the stock-
5. People v. McCoy, 45 How. Prac. 216 (N. Y. 1873). Contra: Villaflor v.
Summers, 41 Philippine 62 (1920).
6. People v. Akin, 25 Cal. App. 373, 143 Pac. 795 (D. C. App. 1914) ; State v.
Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902); McManus v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky.
240, 94 S. W. 2d 609 (1936) ; see Note, 17 Noms DAmaE L. 243 (1942).
7. Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910) ; State v. Oschoa, supra; Bruce
v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 590, 21 S. W. 681 (1893). Contra: Allen v. State, 183 Md.
603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944) ; Ward v. State, 27 Okla. Crim. 362, 228 Pac. 498 (1924).
8. Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529 (1908) ; State v. Barela, 23 N. M.
395, 168 Pac. 545 (1917). Contra: Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879) ; State v. Griffin,
129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924). See Note, 64 A. L. R. 1089 (1930) ; Inbau, Self-
incrimination--What Can an Accused Person Be Compelled to Do?, 28 J. Clmi. L.
261, 264 (1937).
9. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 395, 9 At. 78, 81 (1886).
10. Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 272, 162 S. W. 2d 706 (1942).
11. For a discussion of the history of the privilege see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDEN c
§ 2250 and Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
12. Inbau, supra at 263. For this reason it is often confused with the rule against
untrustworthy confessions. See 8 WiaOmE, EVIDENCE § 2266; Comment, 21 TEX. L.
REv. 816 (1943).
13. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE at 375.
14. 2 id. § 2265; Inbau, supra; Notes, 5 N. C. L. REv. 333, 339 (1927, 1 VAND. L.
REv. 243 (1948).
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holders.' Collections were then made on these notes and deposited in a
trustee account. The commissioner assessed a deficiency against the bank
for the proceeds so collected. The Tax Court upheld the taxpayer.2 On
appeal, the Tax Court was reversed (two judges dissenting). Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F. 2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 867 (1948).
The Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations omit any
general provisions concerning the tax liability of a transferor for proceeds
collected by a transferee.3  Cases indicate that the transferor is not tax-
able for income produced by the property after its transfer.4  The dogma
distinguishes between a transfer of an asset and the transfer of income alone,
generally asserting that when income alone is transferred the transferor
remains taxable.5 This result is reached most easily when accrued income
is transferred since, practically, the effect is as if the transferor had first
collected the income and then transferred the proceeds to another.6 Trans-
fers anticipating future earnings present a greater problem since the right
to receive income in the future is, in one sense, an asset. Courts seem to
hold that one who transfers with a reasonable expectation that the
transferee will realize income within a relatively short time may be taxed
if the transferee makes such realization. Such situations are said to be an-
ticipatory assignments of income.7 The majority in the instant case held
that the notes represented a claim on income only and hence this rule ap-
plied. This followed because once the notes had been charged off and
a tax benefit received, any proceeds, if collected, would have been tax-
able to the corporation had there been no transfer.3 The transfer was
probably effected with the expectation that the notes would shortly be
turned into cash, since collections on others had been made even before
the transfer. Therefore, this decision accords with authority.9  The con-
curring opinion reaches the same result by applying a different line of
authority. Decisions have indicated that if an appreciated asset is trans-
ferred by dividend in kind under such circumstances that the stockholders
appear to be acting for the corporation, then profits realized by the stock-
1. The majority of the court felt bound by the finding of fact of the tax court
that the dividend transfer was "real" and in "good faith." Instant case at 1006.
2. 8 T. C. 831 (1947).
3. INT. REv. CODE § 22 a defines gross income only in the most general terms.
INT. REv. CoDE § 115 j, fixing the value of a dividend in kind as of the value at the
time of transfer, has no application since it deals with the tax of the shareholder
rather than the corporation. Similarly National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 115 F. 2d 875 (9th Cir. 1940), is not controlling. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a) (20) (1943), providing that the distribution of assets in liquidation
will result in no loss or gain to a corporation, is inapplicable since there is here no
liquidation and because the regulation does not define an asset.
4. Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
5. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930). See also Note, 131 A. L. R. 661 (1941).
6. Austin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 161 F. 2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947).
7. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S.
112 (1940). U. S. v. Joliet & C. R. R., 315 U. S. 44 (1943), reaches the same result
in upholding U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.22(a) (19) (1943).
8. INT. Rxv. CODE § 22b(12) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.22b(12-1) (1943).
9. Taxpayer relied upon General Utility v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935). This
decision is no authority for denying tax liability in the instant case because: (1) with-
out defining an asset, it merely lays down the broad general rule that the transfer of
an appreciated asset does not result in tax liability; and (2) the opinion expressly
excludes the question of "bad faith" because the commission failed to raise the issue
in the lower court.
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holders on such assets are taxable to the corporation.10 Such a transfer
has been labelled a subterfuge to escape tax liability.
The decision in the instant case is sensible and in accord with
authority. When the problem of taxability of the transferor is raised, the
prevention of tax evasion must be weighed against the practicability of
administration and fairness to the transferor. While the courts' dichotomy
between asset and potential income is misleading, if we accept it, the de-
cision that the transfer of these charged-off notes was an anticipatory
assignment of income appears to be more valuable as precedent than a
subterfuge theory. It is far easier to prove that a transfer has been made
with the expectation of immediate realization to the transferee than it is
to prove such facts as will lead the courts to upset the whole transfer as
a subterfuge."
Torts-Radio Broadcasting Company Held Liable Only for Neg-
ligent Transmission of Defamatory Utterances of Sponsor's Employee
-Defendant radio broadcasting company leased its facilities to a sponsor
for a news broadcast, during which the announcer, hired by the sponsor
and reading from a prepared manuscript, made certain defamatory re-
marks concerning the plaintiff. On demurrer to the complaint, the court
held that the radio station was a disseminator rather than a publisher
and consequently liable only for negligent failure to prevent transmission
of the defamatory utterances. Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A. 2d 143 (N. J. Ct.
Err. & App. 1948).
The law concerning liability for defamatory radio broadcasts is un-
settled and few decisions exist on the subject. No case has been found
where the broadcasting company itself has produced the program; but
where it merely transmits the program an analogy to newspaper publi-
cation has been seized on to invoke absolute liability for defamatory trans-
missions.' Although the earlier decisions were restricted to readings from
prepared manuscripts, 2 there has been dictum that, because the effect on
the audience is the same, the analogy applies even to interpolations; 3 and
in one case there was no evidence that the utterances were read from a
prepared manuscript. 4 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.'
made a break in the tendency to impose absolute liability and held, at least
for interpolative remarks, that the radio station is not liable without negli-
10. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945).
11. E. g., Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner of Internal-Revenue, 162 F. 2d
316 (5th Cir. 1947) (distinguished from Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court
Holding Co., mtpra, solely on the ground that the stockholders rather than the cor-
poration as an entity entered into negotiations with the vendee for the sale of the
property).
1. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934);
Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932) ; Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc.,
172 Wash. 466, 20 P. 2d 847 (1933). The analogy rests on similarity of subject matter,
broad dissemination, and economic competition. Cf. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74
P. 2d 1127 (1938) (station not liable in broadcast of murder trial proceedings from
court room).
2. Sorenson v. Wood, mopra; Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., supra.
3. See Irwin v. Ashurst, supra at 66, 74 P. 2d at 1129.
4. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., supra.
5. 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939) ; 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 122 (1939).
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gence.6 The instant case adopted that doctrine by calling the station a
disseminator; but since the remarks were read from a prepared manu-
script, it represents an extension.
7
The problem as to whether to impose absolute liability for all de-
famatory transmissions by a broadcasting company is not solved by de-
ciding whether it is a disseminator or a publisher. The reasons which
justify compensating the injured party exist irrespective of the status of
the station as a publisher or disseminator. Argument supporting analysis
in such terms apparently stems from a reluctance to impose liability with-
out fault. Such a reluctance has been overcome elsewhere in the law
where other considerations were sufficiently persuasive.8 Although the
argument that the radio station is better able to pass along the burden
of loss by indemnity insurance has been said to beg the question,9 it is
a valid factor. Often it is more convenient for the injured party to sue
the local station than to sue the sponsor or speaker, especially in the
case of national hookups. The station may implead the other responsible
persons, or may by contract with them protect itself against loss result-
ing from their use of its facilities. 10 To say that the nature of the situa-
tion requires the highest degree of care as a disseminator leaves an area
in which the innocent party can not recover against the station. That area
includes chiefly interpolation and chain broadcasts where no amount of
diligence by the local station can prevent defamatory transmissions. How-
ever, the extent of that area does not seem to justify a rule requiring the
injured party to litigate negligence in all cases against the station-a heavy
burden even with the procedural assistance of res ipsa loquitur.
Unauthorized Practice of Law-Accountant Enjoined From Giv-
ing Federal Tax Law Advice-Bercu, an experienced certified public
accountant, made a study of reported decisions and advised a taxpayer
that a proposed settlement of prior years city's tax claims could be treated
as a current year expense under the Internal Revenue Code. The Lawyers
Association brought this suit to enjoin Bercu from giving legal opinions
concerning the tax laws.1 The court (one justice dissenting) held that
Bercu was illegally practicing law and enjoined him from giving tax law
advice.2  New York County Lawyers Ass'n. v. Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524,
78 N. Y. S. 2d 209 (1st Dep't 1948).
6. See, to the same effect, Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc.
787, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
7. It may be significant that in Pennsylvania even newspapers are not held to
absolute liability for defamatory publications. See Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., supra at 192, 8 A. 2d at 307.
8. E. g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931) (ab-
solute liability for ultra-hazardous activity) ; Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216
N. W. 790 (1927) (absolute liability of vendor based on implied warranty) ; McKee
v. Trisler, 317 Ill. 536, 143 N. E. 69 (1924) (absolute liability of owner of dangerous
animal).
9. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., supra at 203, 8 A. 2d at 312.
10. See McDonald & Grimshaw, Radio Defanation, 9 Am L. ,.v. 328, 350 (1938).
In fact this was done by the station in Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting
Co., supra.
1. N. Y. PExAL LAW § 271 prohibits the practice of law by a layman.
2. The injunction, however, did not restrain Bercu from applying his knowledge
of tax laws when employed primarily in auditing or preparing tax returns.
19491
446 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97
From the inception of federal taxation the accountant has handled
the bulk of the community's taxation problems.8 The lawyer's early
absence from the tax field was due both to his unfamiliarity with tax
matters and to the accountant's expertness with financial data.4 The present
Internal Revenue Code, however, largely disregards accepted accounting
principles in favor of legalistic requirements. 5 The tremendous increase
in the volume and complexity of federal taxation has substantially en-
larged the scope of the lawyer's jurisdiction thus adding to the difficulty
of drawing the "line" between the functions of the two professions.6 The
few cases offer little in the way of solution,7 though a recent Massachusetts
Supreme Court decision supports the instant result.8 Analysis of the in-
stant case indicates an effort to draw an objective line, at very least, where
the accountant undertakes to pass upon a legal question not incidental
to auditing books or preparing tax returns. Concededly, convenience and
immediate economy may favor the accountant assuming jurisdiction over
both the legal and accounting aspects of a tax transaction. The federal
agencies have recognized the need of accountants in the tax field by allow-
ing them to appear in a representative capacity before the Tax Court 9 and
the Treasury Department.' °  It seems imperative, however, that the
danger of imposition or injury to the public by the unqualified legal ad-
viser be eliminated." Although the accountant's skill is desirable in mini-
mizing the client's immediate tax liability, a lawyer's technical judgment
is indispensable in statutory interpretation and in obtaining the best pro-
cedural devices available in event the recorded tax liability is disputed.
1 2
The instant decision is commendable in that it tends to protect tax-
payers from incompetent legal advice. As a matter of practical adminis-
tration, however, what is needed is not a demarcation of functions but
co-operation and team-work between the accountant and the lawyer to
afford the public an efficient tax service. Such a result is already en-
3. May, Accounting and the Accountant in the Administration of Income Taxa-
tion, 47 COL. L. REv. 377 (1947).
4. Vernon, American Bar Association to Sponsor Tax Courses for General Prac-
titioners, 29 A. B. A. J. 516 (1943).
5. E. g., Edelman, Is Income Tax Accounting "Good" Accounting Practice, 24
TAX MAG. 112 (1946) ; Wienshienk, Accountants and the Law, 96 U. oF PA. L. REv.
48, 51 (1947).
6. E. g., Levy, Accountants' Relationship with Lawyers, 72 J. AccOUNTANcY 26
(1941) ; Donaldson, The Interrelation of the Lawyer and the Certified Public Ac-
countant, 18 N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N BuLL. 67 (1946).
7. Accountants' activities held to constitute illegal practice of law: Chicago Bar
Ass'n. v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1st Div.
1941) (negotiation of tax matters before administrative body) ; Mandelbaum v. Gilbert
& Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y. Supp. 462 (City Ct. of N. Y. 1936)
(interpretation of statute). Accountants' activities held not the practice of law: Dun-
lap v. Lebus, 112 Ky. 237, 65 S. W. 441 (1901 (settlement of tax claim) ; Elfenbein
v. Luckenbach Terminals, Inc., 111 N. J. L. 67, 166 Atl. 91 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933)
(devising of tax savings plan).
8. Lowell Bar Ass'n. v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. 2d 27 (1943).
9. 26 CODE FED. REas. § 601.3b (1938).
10. Treas. Circ. No. 230, 1 FED. REG. 1413 (1936).
11. Note, Public Interest in the Restraint of the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
28 IowA L. REv. 116 (1942) ; Hermax Co. 11 T. C. No. 55 (1948).
12. It should be noted in this connection that a favorable settlement on the admin-
istrative level is only achieved because of a strong litigating position.
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visaged by the Conference Plan,1 3 and might be furthered by additions
to the educational programs of both professions.
1 4
Wills-Incompetent Heir-Evidence of Invalidity Requires
Court to Allow Contest by Guardian-Testatrix left surviving a men-
tally incompetent elderly bachelor brother, and a number of cousins. By
her will, duly probated, she placed everything in trust for the in-
competent for life, with remainder in fee to the executor-trustee and
another. The cousins, for whom no provision had been made by the will,
petitioned for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to appeal from
the probate,' alleging that the will was invalid because of fraud, undue
influence, and lack of testamentary capacity. A series of proceedings
followed, 2 during which proponents of the will intervened, and a hear-
ing was finally held at which evidence was presented on all questions in-
volved.3 The lower court decreed that the appeal from probate proceed
no further. It did not pass in any way on the validity of the will, but
rested its decision on the ground that an appeal would be detrimental to
the best interests of the incompetent.4 On appeal the decree was reversed,
and an issue devisavit vel non to the common pleas ordered.5  Brindle
Will, 360 Pa. 53, 60 A. 2d 1 (1948).
As sole heir, the incompetent brother was the only person with
standing to contest the will.6 Had he been competent, evidence of the
will's invalidity would not have imposed upon him a duty to appeal from
13. The Conference Plan is co-operation at the national level between the Bar Asso-
ciation's Committee on Unauthorized Practice and groups of business and professional
men. Maxwell and Charles, Joint Statement as to Tax Accounting and Law Practice,
32 A. B. A. J. 5 (1946).
14. See McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Pol-
icy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L. J. 1345, 1351 (1947).
1. The regularly appointed guardian refused to initiate the appeal, but agreed to
the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Guardians of weak-minded persons are under
the complete control of the common pleas in Pennsylvania. PENNA. STAT. ANN., tit.
50, §§ 941-994 (Purdon, 1931). See Barclay-Westmoreland T. Co. v. Dollar Say.
Bank, 338 Pa. 421, 425, 12 A. 2d 586, 587 (1940).
2. Because only five days remained before the expiration of the statutory period
provided for appeal, the common pleas granted the petitions ex parte, and an appeal
was taken immediately to the orphans' court. Then the proponents of the will inter-
vened.
3. Two proceedings were consolidated: one on a petition to the common pleas to
revoke the authorization of the guardian ad litem to appeal from the probate; the other
on the appeal itself before the orphans' court. The evidence received applied equally
to both proceedings. Mifflin County, where the case arose, has only one judge, who
sits on all sides of the court.
4. No. 232, May Term, 1946, Court of Common Pleas, Mifflin County, opinion
filed Nov. 7, 1947. Printed in Record, pp. 45a-60a.
5. PENNA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 2582 (Purdon, 1930) : "Whenever a dispute upon
a matter of fact arises before any orphans' court, on appeal from any register of wills,
• . . the said court shall, at the request of either party, direct a precept for an issue
to the court of common pleas . .
6. By PENNA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1961 (Purdon, 1930), only "interested per-
sons" may contest wills. E. g., In re McCarty's Estate, 355 Pa. 103, 49 A. 2d 386
(1946) ; In re Knecht's Estate. 341 Pa. 292. 19 A. 2d 111 (1941). The cousins lacked
standing to contest the will. See Hogarth-Swann v. Weed, 274 Mass. 125, 128, 174
N. E. 314, 315 (1931).
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the probate. Because he was incompetent, his affairs lay entirely within
the supervision of the common pleas. The opinion lays such a duty upon
the court acting for him. No precedents on the question have been found.
In an election by an incompetent widow whether to take against a will, the
court decides the matter by determining what is best for its ward,7 but
in such a case there is no question of the validity of the will. While a
narrow construction of the case is possible," the opinion may fairly be
held to mean that, although the law leaves the decision whether to contest
a will to "interested persons" to decide as they see fit, when such a de-
cision must be made by a court it must display a higher kind of honor to
which evidence of fraud is an anathema overcoming every conflicting con-
sideration.9 The difficulty with this view would seem to be that it deprives
incompetents discriminatorily of advantages which persons sui juris re-
tain. Such persons, for example, may settle will disputes by com-
promise. 10 Since they may be estopped, also, in a variety of ways, from
contesting," it is apparent that the policy of the law is not always calcu-
lated to further the uncovering of invalidity of wills. Unless we are pre-
pared to make will contests a public concern, it seems wiser to allow
courts who must safeguard incompetents' estates to make their decisions
as every prudent man makes his own.
7. Harris' Estate, 351 Pa. 368, 41 A. 2d 715 (1945), collecting the Pennsylvania
cases.
8. Since the issues involved were all raised on the appeal, the decision might be
construed as a mere mechanical application of the statute. See note 5 supra. Such an
interpretation does not seem persuasive, however.
9. Most clearly expressed by the concurring opinion, instant case at 63, 60 A. 2d
at 6.
10. PENNA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 787 (Purdon, 1930), construed in Re Norris's
Estate, 329 Pa. 483, 198 Atl. 142 (1938). This is the heavy majority rule. Contra:
In re Gunderson's Estate, 251 Wis. 41, 27 N. W. 2d 896 (1947) ; Lazenby v. Lazenby,
132 Ga. 836, 65 S. E. 120 (1909).
11. E. g., Miller's Appeal, 166 Pa. 97, 31 At. 58 (1895) ; Safe Dep. & T. Co. v.
Hanna, 159 Md. 452, 150 Atl. 870 (1930).
